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COMMENTS
PROTECTING CHILDREN IN LICENSED FAMILY
DAY-CARE HOMES: CAN THE STATE ENTER A
HOME WITHOUT A WARRANT?
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent months, Americans have watched and listened in hor-
ror to a seemingly unending litany of day-care child abuse tragedies.
In Manhattan Beach, California, at the McMartin day-care center,
more than one hundred preschool children were raped and terror-
ized.1 In Contra Costa County, California, Eleanor Nathan, opera-
tor of an unlicensed child-care center, was found guilty of the first-
degree murder of an eleven-month-old boy, thirty-one counts of child
abuse, and one count of mayhem.' In Greer, South Carolina, a teen-
age supervisor at a day-care center pleaded guilty to charges of sexu-
ally abusing seven boys and girls ranging in age from two to eleven
years.' In New York City, four workers at a day-care center were
charged with sexually abusing the children in their care.4
An estimated two million children are enrolled in state-regu-
lated day-care centers and day-care homes throughout the nation.
Countless other children are cared for in unregulated facilities.5 Be-
cause of the sheer number of children enrolled in day-care, the con-
cern for their safety is reaching epidemic proportions.'
Public outrage has contributed to a growing conflict between
protecting the privacy rights of licensed family day-care providers
© 1985 by Sandra Feldman
1. Brutalized, TIME, April 2, 1984, at 21.
2. S.F. Chronicle, Jan. 14, 1983, at 3, col. 3.
3. Leo, "Some Day, I'll Cry My Eyes Out," TIME, April 23, 1984, at 72.
4. What Price Day Care?, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 10, 1984, at 14.
5. See supra note 3. It is not known how many children are cared for by neighbors or
friends who are unlicensed, but most licensing authorities believe that the numbers are
growing.
6. An Epidemic of Child Abuse, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 20, 1984, at 44. However, for a
sobering reminder that most child abuse takes place in the child's own home by his parents or
close family members, see Weinstein, Child-Care Centers Can Be Havens Against Abuse,
L.A. Times, Oct. 29, 1984, § II, at 5, col. 5.
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and protecting the health and safety of children within day-care
homes. Parents and state officials, alarmed at the possibilities for
child neglect and abuse by child-care providers, want to enter the
day-care homes quickly and without prior warning to protect the
welfare of the children. However, the home has always been a core
area of privacy. It is afforded maximum protection by the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution against unreasonable
searches and seizures.7 The fourth amendment requires that before a
house search begins, a search warrant based on probable cause must
be issued by a neutral, detached magistrate.'
The growing conflict between the fourth amendment protection
afforded to the family home and concern for the health and safety of
the children must be resolved. In order to protect the children, a
lawful search of the family day-care home may be essential. How-
ever, if the privacy rights of the day-care provider are to be pro-
tected, the search must be conducted in a manner that is minimally
intrusive.
Clearly the public is concerned with the health and safety of
children in child-care centers as well as in family day-care homes.
However, the tension between privacy rights and the protection of
the children is more pronounced in a private home as opposed to a
public facility. Accordingly, this comment focuses on the family day-
care home. The various standards applied by the courts in search
cases will be reviewed. The requirement of a warrant based on prob-
able cause as well as the applicable exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement will be analyzed. The standards will then be applied to
licensed family day-care settings to determine which standard is most
appropriate. The balancing test,9 which is presently used to deter-
mine the applicable standard as new situations arise, will also be
examined. This comment will recommend that, absent exigent cir-
7. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 574 (1980) (fourth amendment prohibits war-
rantless and nonconsensual entry into suspect's home in order to make an arrest). See also
Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972) (fourth amendment requires that warrant be
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate who must be capable of determining the existence
of probable cause); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (search of hotel room
without a search warrant violates the fourth amendment).
9. Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (with certain carefully defined excep-
tions, an unconsented, warrantless search of private property is "unreasonable").
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cumstances, a search warrant based on "reasonable articulable suspi-
cion"'" be issued before a search of a licensed family day-care home
begins. Although this standard has never been used as a basis for a
warrant, its adoption would prevent the erosion of the day-care pro-
vider's privacy rights, while helping to protect the health and safety
of the children.
II. LICENSED FAMILY DAY-CARE HOMES
The number of women who work outside the home has in-
creased dramatically. Indeed, statistics reveal that the number of
working women has almost doubled in the past ten years." As a
result, parents are competing for a limited number of affordable, safe
day-care facilities.'"
The California Child Care Resources and Referral Network'"
divides child-care facilities into two main categories. The first cate-
gory, child-care centers, includes day-care centers, preschools, nurs-
ery schools, infant centers and school-age programs.' Child-care
centers are regulated by the State Department of Social Services un-
less specifically exempted from licensure (i.e. park and recreation
10. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (an officer may make an intrusion short of
arrest when he has reasonable apprehension of danger: and if he believes his safety or the
safety of others is endangered, he may make a reasonable search for weapons).
11. Child Care, S.F. Chronicle, May 4, 1984, at 24, col. I (the proportion of working
mothers increased from four in ten in 1970 to over one in two in 1980). See also Day Care in
New York: A Growing Need, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1983, at C1, col. 3 (services lacking include
sufficient day-care for low and middle income families and children under two years of age,
and after-school programs for children ages five to 12).
12. See supra note 4. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE CUR-
RENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS SERIES P-23, No. 117,
TRENDS IN CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENTS OF WORKING MOTHERS (June 1982) (report ex-
amines day-care arrangements of working and nonworking mothers). See also Child Care,
S.F. Chronicle, May 4, 1984, at 24, col. 1, which states that statistics show that approximately
22% of arrangements made by working mothers for their children under the age of five are
with family day care, a friend, or a neighbor. About 15% of the arrangements are with child-
care centers, 29% with a relative, 5.5% with a baby sitter in the child's home and 23% with the
mother or father. Over half of all mothers with young children work outside the home. Id.
13. The California Child Care Resources and Referral Network is a nonprofit public
benefit corporation that represents 55 agencies located in 44 counties throughout California.
Funded by the state since 1976, its services include helping parents fund child care, docu-
menting community child care needs, providing technical assistance to new and existing prov-
iders of care, and facilitating communication between existing child care and child-related ser-
vice providers. See CHILD CARE INFORMATION KIT (available from California Child Care
Resource and Referral Network, San Francisco, Cal.).
14. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, §§ 8100-81187.2, R.83-42 (1983) for application
requirements and licensing procedures for child care centers. See also S.F. Chronicle, May 4,
1984, at 24, col. 1 (overview of child-care regulations).
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programs or private parent cooperatives). These centers must meet
specific health, fire and building standards. In addition, they must
have a qualified director who is a high school graduate with a mini-
mum of fifteen semester units in early childhood education. The di-
rector must have at least four years of teaching experience in a li-
censed child care center. There also must be one teacher for every
twelve students and at least seventy-five square feet of outdoor activ-
ity space for each child."5
The second category, family day care, is typically provided in
private homes, sometimes by skilled professionals, but more often by
women without professional training who care simultaneously for
their own children as well. 6 There are no federal licensing require-
ments for family day-care homes, therefore each state is free to fash-
ion its own regulations.' 7
In California, the State Department of Social Services also li-
censes family day-care homes. However, the family day-care homes
are subject to fewer state and local regulations than child-care cen-
ters.' The regulations are designed to insure the health and safety of
the children within the home. Family day-care operators do not have
to meet any educational requirements.
A family day-care home is defined by statute in California as "a
home which regularly provides care, protection, and supervision of 12
or fewer children, in the provider's own home, for periods of less
than 24 hours per day while parents or guardians are away."' 9 In
15. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, §§ 8100-81187.2, R.83-42 (1983).
16. Ferraro, Tax Controls, Abuses Nationwide Spawn Suits, Reform Efforts, L.A.
Daily J., May 7, 1984, at 4, col. 3.
17. For an informative article criticizing child-care regulations, see Majors, Child-Care
Regulations Are Stifling Entrepreneurship Among Women, L.A. Daily J., Aug. 24, 1983, at
4, col. 3. See also Day Care Centers Are Linked to Some Diseases of Children, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 10, 1983, at A12, col. I (because regulations vary among states and money is often inade-
quate for strict enforcement of rules, diarrhea, dysentery, and other intestinal diseases are
difficult to control).
18. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, §§ 88001-88038, R.82-5 (1982) for application re-
quirements and licensing procedures for family day-care homes.
19. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1596.78 (West Supp. 1985) provides:
"Family day care home" means a home which regularly provides care, pro-
tection, and supervision of 12 or fewer children, in the provider's own home, for
periods of less than 24 hours per day, while the parents or guardians are away,
and includes the following:
(1) "Large family day care home" which means a home which provides family
day care to 7 to 12 children, inclusive, including children who reside at the
home, as defined in regulations.
(2) "Small family day care home" which means a home which provides family
day care to six or fewer children, including children who reside at the home, as
defined in regulations.
(Vol. 25
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addition, the residential characteristics of day-care homes are recog-
nized explicitly by the legislature's mandate that, unlike other child-
care facilities, family day-care homes constitute a residential use of
property for the purposes of local zoning ordinances and building
codes.20 This distinction underscores the legislative intent to treat in-
stitutions and homes differently even when they both provide child
care.
In California, the licensing requirements for family day-care
homes are minimal. Anyone in good health who does not have a
criminal record may apply.2" If more than six children are cared for
Id.
20. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1597.45 (West Supp. 1985) provides:
All of the following shall apply to small family day care homes:
(a) The use of single-family residence as a small family day care home shall be
considered a residential use of property for the purposes of all local ordinances.
(b) No local jurisdiction shall impose any business license, fee, or tax for the
privilege of operating a small family day care home.
(c) Use of a single-family dwelling for purposes of a small family day care home
shall not constitute a change of occupancy for purposes of Part 1.5 (commencing
with Section 17910) of Division 13 (State Housing Law) or for purposes of local
building codes.
(d) A small family day care home shall not be subject to the provisions of Article
I (commencing with Section 13100) or Article 2 (commencing with Section 13140)
of Chapter I of Part 2, except that a small family day care home shall contain a
fire extinguisher or smoke detector device, or both, which meets standards estab-
lished by the State Fire Marshal.
Id.
21. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE, supra note 18. See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
1522 (West Supp. 1985) which reads in pertinent part:
It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to require the finger-
prints of those individuals whose contact with community care clients may pose
a risk to the client's health and safety.
(a) Before issuing a license or special permit to any person or persons to operate
or manage a community care facility, the state department shall secure from an
appropriate law enforcement agency a criminal record to determine whether the
applicant or any other person specified in subdivision (b) has ever been con-
victed of a crime other than a minor traffic violation. No fee shall be charged by
the Department of Justice or the state department for the fingerprinting of an
applicant for a license or special permit to operate a facility providing nonmedi-
cal board, room, and care for six or less children or for obtaining a criminal
record of such an applicant pursuant to this section. If it is found that the appli-
cant or any other person specified in subdivision (b) has been convicted of a
crime, other than a minor traffic violation, the application shall be denied, un-
less the director grants an exemption pursuant to subdivision (e).
(b) In addition to the applicant, the provisions of this section shall be applicable
to criminal convictions of the following persons:
(1) Adults responsible for administration or direct supervision of staff.
(2) Any person, other than a client, residing in the facility.
(3) Any person who provides client assistance in dressing, grooming, bathing, or
personal hygiene.
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in the home,22 a fire safety clearance must be obtained. In addition,
no fees are charged for obtaining a license or for renewal. 3
Licensing reviews are limited by statute to health and safety
considerations. They do not include evaluations of the quality of care
or the education or training offered by the day-care provider.2 ' A
licensing review is typically an unannounced visit and must be con-
ducted at least every year.25 However, if a parent, neighbor, or citi-
zen suspects a violation of applicable requirements, he may request
an inspection of any community care facility, including a family day-
care home. If a complaint is made, licensing authorities are required
to make an on-site inspection within ten days.26 California Health
(4) Any staff person or employee who has frequent and routine contact with the
clients. In determining who has frequent contact, any volunteer who is in the
facility shall be exempt unless the volunteer is used to replace or supplement
staff in providing direct care and supervision of clients. In determining who has
routine contact, staff and employees under direct on site supervision and who
are not providing direct care and supervision or who have only occasional or
intermittent contact with clients shall be exempt.
Id.
22. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1597.54 (West Supp. 1985) provides in relevant
part:
An applicant for initial licensure as a family day care home for children shall
file with the department, pursuant to its regulations, an application on forms
furnished by the department, which shall include, but not be limited to, all of
the following: . . .
(b) Evidence that the small family day care home contains a fire extinguisher or
smoke detector device, or both, which meets standards established by the State
Fire Marshal under subdivision (d) of Section 1597.45 or evidence that the
large family day care home meets the standards established by the State Fire
Marshal under subdivision (d) of Section 1597.46.
Id. (emphasis added).
23. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1596.97 (West 1985) provides:
A license or special permit for a day care center for children may be issued for a
period not to exceed three years, providing the licensee has been found not to be
in violation of any statutory requirements or rules or regulations during the
preceding license period. No fee shall be required to accompany any application
for a license, special permit, or license renewal of any such facility.
Id.
24. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1597.05 (West Supp. 1985) provides in pertinent
part:
"(a) Licensing reviews of care and services of a day care center shall be limited to health
and safety considerations and shall not include any reviews of the content of any educational or
training program of the facility."
25. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1597.09 (West Supp. 1985) provides:
"Site visitations shall be made as provided in this section as follows:
(a) A site visitation to all licensed day care centers shall be made annually.
(b) A site visitation shall be required for the renewal of a license."
26. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1596.853 (West Supp. 1985) provides:
(a) Any person may request an inspection of any child day care facility in accor-
dance with this chapter by transmitting to the department notice of an alleged
1985] SEARCHES OF FAMILY DAY CARE 417
and Safety Code sections 153327 and 1597.5528 allow a state agent to
enter and inspect any place providing personal care, supervision, and
violation of applicable requirements prescribed by the statutes or regulations of
this state. A complaint may be made either orally or in writing.
(b) The substance of the complaint shall be provided to the licensee no earlier
than at the time of the inspection. Unless the complainant specifically requests
otherwise, neither the substance of the complaint provided the licensee nor any
copy of the complaint or any record published, released, or otherwise made
available to the licensee shall disclose the name of any person mentioned in the
complaint, except the name of any duly authorized officer, employee, or agent of
the department conducting the investigation or inspection pursuant to this
chapter.
(c) Upon receipt of a complaint, other than a complaint alleging denial of a
statutory right of access to a child day care facility, the department shall make a
preliminary review and, unless the department determines that the complaint is
willfully intended to harass a licensee or is without any reasonable basis, the
department shall make an on site inspection within 10 days after receiving the
complaint. In either event, the complainant shall be promptly informed of the
department's proposed course of action.
(d) Upon receipt of a complaint alleging denial of a statutory right of access to a
child day care facility, the department shall review the complaint. The com-
plainant shall be notified promptly of the department's proposed course of
action.
Id.
27. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1533 (West Supp. 1985) provides in pertinent
part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, any duly authorized officer, em-
ployee or agent of the state department may, upon presentation of proper identi-
fication, enter and inspect any place providing personal care, supervision, and
services at any time, with or without advance notice, to secure compliance with,
or to prevent a violation of, any provision of this chapter.
id.
28. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1597.55 (West Supp. 1985) provides in pertinent
part:
No site visitations, or unannounced visits or spot checks, shall be made under
this chapter except as provided in this section.
(a) A site visitation shall be required prior to the initial licensing of the
applicant.
(b) An unannounced site visitation shall be required for the renewal of a
license.
(c) A public agency under contract with the department ... may make spot
checks if it does not result in any cost to the state. However, spot checks shall
not be required by the department.
(d) The department or licensing agency shall make an unannounced site
visitation on the basis of a complaint and a followup visit as provided in Section
1597.56.
(e) In addition to any site visitation or spot check authorized under this
section, the department shall annually make unannounced visits on 10 percent of
all family day care homes for children licensed under this chapter. The unan-
nounced visits may be made at any time, including the time of a request for a
renewal of a license.
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services. These provisions will be discussed more fully in section IV
C, infra.
Having discussed the purpose and regulatory scheme of family
day-care homes, it is necessary to examine the protections offered by
the fourth amendment to family day-care providers. The Supreme
Court has outlined search and seizure standards and warrant re-
quirements which protect citizens from unreasonable governmental
intrusion. A review of these standards is necessary before determin-
ing which standard in particular is applicable to licensed family day-
care homes.
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. General Background
The fourth amendment protects individuals from unreasonable
searches and seizures by requiring that all warrants must be based
on probable cause.29 A valid warrant can be issued only upon a
showing to a magistrate that there is probable cause for a search or
an arrest.8 0 The prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures has been construed to require probable cause for warrantless
searches and seizures as well.31
Historically, the need for protection against unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion developed from the concept that a man's home
was his castle.3 2 Protecting a private dwelling from physical entry by
the government was the primary objective of the fourth amend-
ment,8" therefore, all searches and seizures in a home without a war-
rant were presumptively unreasonable and a fortiori unconstitu-
tional." ' Justice Bradley, emphasizing that the fourth amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is one of the
most essential constitutional guarantees of liberty, stated in Boyd v.
United States that the fourth amendment applies as follows:
[T]o all invasions . . . of the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, . . . that
29. See supra note 7 for the text of the fourth amendment.
30. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (no reasonable ground or probable
cause exists for arrest where information is so vague or untested that it could not be accepted
as probable cause for issuance of a warrant).
31. W. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 1.2 (1972).
32. Id.
33. United States v. United States Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313
(1972) (electronic surveillance involves broad intrusions into conversational privacy which ne-
cessitates fourth amendment protection).
34. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
[Vol. 25
SEARCHES OF FAMILY DAY CARE
constitutes . . . the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefen-
sible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property ... , it is the invasion of [a] sacred right. 5
In order to insure fourth amendment protection, the government re-
quires that specific procedures be followed before a search begins.
B. Issuance of the Warrant
The general rule is that a search must be based on a valid war-
rant. A search warrant is an order in Writing, signed by a magis-
trate, which directs a police officer to search for personal property
and bring it before a magistrate. 6 The places to be searched and the
evidence to be seized must be described with "reasonable particular-
ity" such that the officer need not rely on his own discretion in de-
ciding where to search and what to seize.37 A search warrant " 'in-
terposes an orderly procedure' involving 'judicial impartiality'
whereby a 'neutral and detached magistrate' can make 'informed and
deliberate determinations' on the issues of probable cause."3 8
The Supreme Court has held that the warrant need not be is-
sued by a lawyer or a judge. However, an issuing magistrate must
meet two tests: "He must be neutral and detached, and he must be
capable of determining whether probable cause exists for the re-
quested arrest or search."" In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the
State Attorney General who was the chief prosecutor in the case was
also authorized under state law to issue search warrants as a justice
of the peace. The Supreme Court held that he was not the "neutral
and detached magistrate required by the Constitution."40 Hence, the
Court requires that someone removed from the immediate situation
review the evidence in order to determine whether probable cause
exists.
C. Requirement of Probable Cause
It is not entirely clear what constitutes probable cause. The Su-
preme Court stated in Brinegar v. United States that it is more than
35. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885).
36. Allen v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 331, 135 P.2d 242, 247-48 (1943) (search and
seizure warrant for milk bottles did not give sheriff sufficient information to determine which
bottles to seize).
37. Id. at 333, 135 P.2d at 249.
38. 2 W. LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 29 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
39. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972).
40. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971).
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bare suspicion.41 Probable cause exists when an arresting officer has
knowledge of reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances which
would warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense
has been or is being committed. 42 The standard for probable cause is
often expressed in probabilities. Probable cause to arrest exists
where there is a substantial probability that the person to be arrested
has committed a crime. Probable cause to search exists when there is
a substantial probability that evidence of a crime will be presently
found at a specific place. 43 However, the requirement of probable
cause is not an inflexible rule. The court upholds searches and
seizures on a lower standard of proof when the facts indicate that the
search or seizure is reasonable."
D. Balancing Test
The fourth amendment does not prohibit all searches and
seizures that are not based on probable cause, but only those that are
unreasonable. In Camara v. Municipal Court," the Court held that
the reasonableness of a search must be determined by balancing the
intrusiveness of the search against public need. 4" Narrowly defined
exceptions to the probable cause requirement have developed as
courts have applied the balancing test to new situations in order to
test the reasonableness of a search or seizure.' 7 Notwithstanding the
exceptions, the general rule is that probable cause is required as a
basis for a search warrant,'8 for an arrest warrant within a home,' 9
and to sustain a warrantless arrest outside the home. 50
41. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
42. Id. at 175-76.
43. Y. KAMISAR, W. LA FAVE & J. ISRAEL, BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 268 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]. See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91
(1964) (probable cause to arrest); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (probable
cause to search).
44. La Fave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries, 74B J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1199
(1983).
45. 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
46. Id.
47. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971). See also Camara, 387
U.S. 523, 536-38.
48. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (state must demonstrate that
consent to search a suspect who is not in custody is voluntary).
49. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-89 (1980).
50. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976) (warrantless public arrest for
felony based on probable cause does not violate the fourth amendment).
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E. Administrative Probable Cause
The Supreme Court first applied the balancing test in situations
when limited intrusions were outweighed by compelling public need.
The Court held in Camara v. Municipal Court 1 that inspections of
residential buildings to assess compliance with fire, health or safety
regulations will be upheld only if such inspections are based on a
valid search warrant. In Camara, the defendant faced criminal
charges because he violated the San Francisco Housing Code by re-
fusing to allow building inspectors to inspect his residence without a
warrant. The Court held that the defendant had a constitutional
right under the fourth amendment to insist that the inspectors obtain
a warrant to search.52 The rationale of Camara has been extended
to inspections of commercial buildings as well."3 However, although
a warrant is required for these inspections, a lesser showing of prob-
able cause is required to sustain the warrant. All that is needed is
either evidence of a regulatory violation"' or evidence of a reasonable
legislative or administrative plan developed to serve a valid public
need." The Court, applying the balancing test to determine the rea-
sonableness of administrative searches, concluded that because the
searches were not personal in nature and were not intended to un-
cover crime, a search warrant could be issued on less than traditional
probable cause."
F. No Warrant Required
The probable cause and warrant requirements protect against
unreasonable searches and seizures by limiting the power of the gov-
ernment to intrude into private lives. However, the Supreme Court,
in addition to upholding administrative searches on less than proba-
ble cause, has recognized situations in which a warrant is not re-
quired at all.' 7 The Court has applied the balancing test and deter-
mined that when obtaining a warrant would be unduly burdensome
and in contravention of the governmental interest in law enforce-
51. Camara, 387 U.S. 523.
52. Id.
53. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 499-508 (1978) (warrant required for search of
burned furniture after fire had been extinguished).
54. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (warrant required for inspection of
a business premises pursuant to § 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
(OSHA)).
55. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538.
56. Id. at 537.
57. See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
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ment, and when the intrusion into privacy rights would be minimal,
a search or brief stop of an individual may be upheld without a war-
rant." Warrants are generally not required if there are exigent cir-
cumstances, 9 if free and voluntary consent is given, 0 or if there is
"implied consent." 6' Warrants are also not required for a brief stop
and pat-down search on the street if the officer has a "reasonable
articulable suspicion" that the suspect is armed or that criminal ac-
tivity is afoot. 2
A search or seizure without a warrant is "per se" unreasonable
under the fourth amendment unless it can be justified under one of
the exceptions to the warrant requirement. 3 These exceptions are
carefully drawn,6" and the burden is on the government to show that
obtaining a warrant was impracticable or impossible in any given
situation."
1. Exigent Circumstances
The exigent circumstances exception allows for immediate offi-
cial action by the government in emergency situations. Exigent cir-
cumstances are usually found when there is an imminent danger of
the destruction of evidence, when there is a risk of danger to police
officers or others, or when there is a risk that the suspect will es-
cape.66 A search incident to a lawful arrest is valid without a war-
rant and justified as an exigency because an arresting officer is al-
58. Id.
59. Exigent circumstances are present when police must act quickly and without prior
judicial approval or they will be unable to make a search or seizure. United States v. Camp-
bell, 581 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1978) (exigent circumstances justified warrantless arrests of
defendants in their apartments when crime was armed robbery and when there was reason to
believe that defendants might escape, destroy the evidence, or risk an armed confrontation). See
also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385,
392 (D.C. Cir. 1970). For examples of emergency situations see United States v. Santana, 427
U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (hot pursuit); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768-70 (1966)
(destruction of evidence); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (officer has reason-
able cause to believe that his life or the lives of others may be in imminent danger).
60. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
61. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (mine safety); United States v. Biswell, 406
U.S. 311 (1972) (firearms); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970)
(liquor).
62. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968).
63. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
64. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455 (quoting Jones v. United States,, 357 U.S. 493, 499
(1958)).
65. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455.
66. Id. See also supra note 59.
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ways in a potentially dangerous situation. 7
2. Consent
If free or voluntary consent is given for a search (or an arrest
within a home) no warrant is required.68 The Supreme Court has
held that the government must justify an otherwise unconstitutional
search based on consent, by showing "that the consent was in fact
voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or
implied." '69 The courts, however, are divided on the issue of whether
the validity of the consent should be determined by the state of mind




The Supreme Court has carved out yet another exception to the
warrant requirement for certain heavily regulated industries.
71
When industries have had a long and consistent history of govern-
mental regulation and attention, the Court has reasoned that person-
nel within those industries are "on notice." They have, therefore,
impliedly consented to any reasonable search necessary to enforce
code or statutory regulations.
7 2
4. No Warrant Required When Officer has Reasonable Ar-
ticulable Suspicion
In the seminal case, Terry v. Ohio,7 3 the Supreme Court recog-
nized that if a search or seizure were only a limited intrusion, it
could be based on less than probable cause. In Terry, the defendant,
who allegedly was "casing" a store, was subjected to a brief deten-
67. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
68. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218.
69. Id.
70. Id. (state of mind of the person allegedly giving consent); People v. Henderson, 33
111. 2d 225, 210 N.E.2d 483 (1965) (state of mind of the police officer as a "reasonable man").
71. See supra note 61 for cases involving heavily regulated industries. But see Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (Court refused to approve warrantless inspections under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act).
72. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, at 600-04 (1981). The Majority has suggested
that length of regulation is only one factor to be considered. If the duration of regulation were
the only criteria, new or emerging industries which pose enormous potential danger (such as
the nuclear power industry) could never be searched without a warrant "even under the most
carefully structured inspection program." d. at 606.
73. 392 U.S. I (1968).
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tion and pat-down search for weapons."' The Court reasoned that
because of the necessity for immediate action, the fourth amendment
warrant requirement was inapplicable. 5 Instead, the Court tested
the police conduct under the reasonableness requirement of the
fourth amendment.7 6 To comply with the reasonableness standard,
the search or seizure must be justified in its inception, and it must be
based on the officer's particularized, objective belief. The search or
seizure also must be justified in scope and reasonably related in pur-
pose to carrying out that belief." The Terry Court applied the
Camara balancing test in order to weigh the governmental need
against the harm to the defendant and ultimately concluded that the
search was reasonable. 8
The quantum of evidence necessary to sustain the limited intru-
sion in Terry under the reasonableness standard is "reasonable ar-
ticulable suspicion. '79 If a brief detention is involved, the reasonable,
experienced police officer (reasonable) must be able to describe or
point to facts (articulable) which give rise to his objective belief (sus-
picion).80 Although not precisely defined by the Court, the degree of
suspicion must be more than a mere hunch but less than probable
cause.8 ' Whereas probable cause is "more probable than not"82 or a
"substantial probability,"88 the degree of suspicion here may be a
"substantial possibility."84 To justify a brief, pat-down search, the
reasonable, experienced police officer (reasonable) must be able to
describe or point to facts (articulable) which lead him to believe that
there is a "substantial possibility" that the defendant is armed and
dangerous (suspicion).85
Thus, Terry v. Ohio and its progeny represent a departure by
the Supreme Court from the traditional rule that under the fourth
74. Id.
75. Id. at 20.
76. Id. at 20-22.
77. Id. at 19-22.
78. Id. at 21-31.
79. Id. at 22.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
82. See BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 43.
83. Id.
84. La Fave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Be-
yond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 40, 73-75 (1968).
85. Vawrinek, Fourth Amendment - Detention of Occupants During a Premises
Search: The Winter of Discontent for Probable Cause, 72 J. OF CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
1246, 1253 (1981).
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amendment only probable cause can demonstrate reasonableness."
The Court has shifted its focus from probable cause to a balancing of
governmental need against the relative intrusiveness of the search or
seizure. The reasonable articulable suspicion standard originally was
carved out of the fourth amendment requirement of probable cause
to protect the police and the general public during street encounters
with criminal suspects. However, the standard has been extended
from the Terry "stop and frisk" scenario to other carefully delineated
limited intrusions as well.87
Having analyzed the fourth amendment's requirement of proba-
ble cause as well as the various exceptions mapped out by the Court,
it is necessary to apply the standards to family day-care homes. It is
clear that each standard when applied to family day-care will have
far-reaching implications. Accordingly, each standard must be care-
fully scrutinized in order to determine which one will most effec-
tively balance the interests of children and day-care providers.
IV. WHICH STANDARD SHOULD BE APPLIED TO LICENSED
FAMILY DAY-CARE HOMES?
A. A Warrant Based on Criminal Probable Cause
Rush v. Obledo is the only reported appellate court decision
which addresses the issue of warrantless searches of licensed family
day-care homes."8 In Rush, the plaintiffs sought relief against the
State of California Department of Social Services for its practice of
unannounced, warrantless inspections of private homes." At issue in
the case was California Health and Safety Code section 1533 which
allows any authorized agent of the State Department of Social Ser-
vices to enter and inspect "any place providing personal care, super-
vision, and services at any time, with or without advance notice, to
secure compliance with, or to prevent a violation of, any provision of
this chapter." 90 The district court in Rush held that California stat-
utes and regulations which permit warrantless inspections of family
day-care homes violate the fourth amendment. The district court rea-
soned that warrantless searches could not be justified under the
86. Id. at 1254-55.
87. Id. at 1255-56. For the most recent Supreme Court decision applying the reasona-
bleness standard, see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985) (search of students without
probable cause upheld under the reasonableness standard).
88. 756 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1985).
89. The plaintiffs included operators of a licensed family day-care home and an associa-
tion of licensed family day-care providers. Id.
90. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1596.853 (West Supp. 1985), supra note 26.
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"closely regulated industry" exception to the warrant requirement
for administrative searches or on a general "reasonableness" basis
determined by balancing the state's interest against the provider's in-
terest.91 The district court stated that "[T]he protections afforded to
a private home are in no way diminished by the fact that the occu-
pant of the home is paid to care for a few children from other peo-
ple's families part of the day." 92 The court emphasized that because
the licensing requirements are minimal, 93 family day-care providers
are not highly regulated. Accordingly, such providers have not im-
pliedly consented to the intrusiveness of a search without a properly
issued warrant simply because they are day-care providers. As Judge
Patel quoted in Rush v. Obledo:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the
forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the
wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain enter;
but the King of England cannot enter-all his forces dares not
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.9"
Applying this analogy to the plight of the day-care provider, Judge
Patel further explained:
In this case, the King is the State of California, his force is a
social worker, and the man in his cottage is the woman (in most
instances) in her family day-care home. But the principle is no
different. Under the fourth amendment to our Constitution,
government representatives cannot enter a home uninvited with-
out prior judicial authority in the form of a warrant. Nothing in
the nature, history, or operation of California family day care
homes warrant an exception to this rule, one of the most cher-
ished values of our society.95
Under the district court's rationale, family day-care providers
would be afforded the most protection from governmental intrusion.
Courts would require a valid search warrant issued by a magistrate
upon a showing of traditional "criminal" probable cause. However,
under this standard, a warrant would not be issued unless a parent,
neighbor, state official, or ordinary citizen convinced a magistrate
that there was a substantial probability that evidence of a crime
91. 517 F. Supp. 905, 908.
92. Rush, 517 F. Supp. at 914.
93. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, §§ 88001 - 88038, R.82-5 (1982).
94. 517 F. Supp. 905, 917 (citing Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958)
(quoting remarks attributed to William Pitt, Earl of Chatham in 1763)).
95. Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision affirming in part Judge Patel's
opinion is discussed infra notes 103-108.
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would be discovered. 96
The criminal probable cause standard applied by the district
court in Rush affords the family day-care home maximum fourth
amendment protection. But what about protecting the children?
Clearly, if the police believe that children are being mistreated, an
exigency exists, and entry will be immediate.97 But what if the sus-
pected danger is not so obvious? Torture and abuse of children alleg-
edly occurred at the McMartin School in Manhattan Beach for
nearly ten years before it was brought to public attention.98 More-
over, potentially dangerous situations such as over-crowding or poor
supervision may not appear serious to a magistrate who is accus-
tomed to reviewing probable cause in a tradition criminal context.
The magistrate may not be convinced that the amount of evidence
presented meets the traditional probable cause standard. If the war-
rant is not issued, officials are forced to wait until they gather more
evidence or until the situation escalates into an emergency before
they can lawfully enter the day-care home.
Children in licensed family day-care homes are in special need
of protection. They are away from their parents and are often se-
cluded from public scrutiny behind closed doors for most of the
day.99 Because they are young, the children may have difficulty com-
municating their problems to responsible adults. More importantly,
the children may not understand what constitutes appropriate behav-
ior for adults responsible for their well-being. Finally, it is possible
that their parents are unaware of the problems which may exist
within the day-care home. Such considerations render young chil-
dren in licensed family day-care homes particularly vulnerable. Be-
cause the criminal probable cause standard is so difficult to meet, the
standard ultimately fails to provide the protection these children re-
quire.100 Probable cause is too high a standard for the state to meet
if it is to effectively protect the health and safety of children in fam-
ily day-care homes. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the applica-
bility of standards other than traditional probable cause.
96. Id. at 917.
97. See supra note 59.
98. S.F. Chronicle, May 4, 1984, at 24, col. 3.
99. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1596.78 (West Supp. 1985), supra note 19.
100. But see Rush, 517 F. Supp. 905 (because the state chooses to subject family day-
care providers to criminal sanctions, an administrative inspection warrant based on probable
cause must be issued before any inspection to determine whether or not a violation of statutes
or regulations governing family day-care homes occurs). Id. at 917.
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B. A Warrant Based on Administrative Probable Cause
The Supreme Court in Camara v. Municipal Court'' held
that under certain circumstances, periodic inspections of buildings
will be upheld even when the search warrant is based on less than
probable cause. However, to justify the application of the lower stan-
dard, there must be evidence of a violation or a showing that reason-
able legislative or administrative standards are being satisfied.'0 2
Clearly, this lesser showing of probable cause would give the
state easier access to the children within day-care homes and thus
afford the children greater protection. However, unlike previous ap-
plications of an administrative search warrant, in the context of day-
care, the government is not inspecting the home for code violations
alone, but primarily to uncover criminal activity. Moreover, unlike
the limited search allowed under Camara, a search of the family
day-care home must be more thorough and extensive if it is to effec-
tively protect the health and safety of the children. An administrative
search warrant is always available for uncovering code violations.
However, if the real purpose of the search is to detect criminal activ-
ity, the administrative search warrant is not appropriate.
C. No Warrant Required
The state in Rush v. Obledo argued that warrantless entry into
licensed family day-care homes can be justified either under the
"closely regulated industry" exception or on a general "reasonable-
ness" standard (based on balancing the state's interest against the
provider's interest.)' 03 While the case was pending appeal before the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the California legislature enacted
new statutes and implemented regulations to govern licensing and
operation of family day-care homes.'0 4 Section 1596.852 was enacted
with language identical to section 1533, the statute initially chal-
lenged by the plaintiffs in Rush.'05 Under another new section,
101. 387 U.S. 523.
102. Id. at 538.
103. Rush, 517 F. Supp. at 908.
104. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1597.50 (added by legislature in 1981, re-
numbered § 1597.30 and amended in 1983); § 1597.65 (West Supp. 1985). See also CAL. AD-
MIN. CODE tit. 22, §§ 88001-88038, R.82-5, supra note 18.
105. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1596.852 (West Supp. 1985) provides:
Any duly authorized officer, employee, or agent of the department may,
upon presentation of proper identification, enter and inspect any place providing
personal care, supervision, and services at any time, with or without advance
notice, to secure compliance with, or to prevent a violation of, any provision of
this chapter.
[Vol. 25
SEARCHES OF FAMILY DAY CARE
1597.55, limited unannounced inspections are now mandatory for li-
cense renewal and required annually for ten percent of all licensed
day-care homes.1 06
The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the
district court's decision in Rush. It held that because family day-care
homes were pervasively regulated, limited warrantless inspections of
family day-care homes do not offend the fourth amendment.107 It
found, however, that section 1596.852 was invalid, but that section
1597.55 is sufficiently narrow to pass constitutional muster. The
court did not further address the applicability of section 1533 be-
cause it determined that the section had been repealed and had been
made inapplicable to family day-care homes under the new statutory
scheme.1 08 The court of appeals' decision mandates that in Califor-
nia, day care is now a "pervasively regulated business." Therefore,
under the statutes now in effect, limited warrantless searches of fam-
ily day-care homes will be permitted.
The Rush decision does not represent a balanced solution.
Clearly it affords more immediate access to the children. But if a
warrant is not required to search a family day-care home for evi-
dence of criminal activity, even when the search is limited by regula-
tions as it is under present California law, the fourth amendment
safeguard of a "neutral and detached" magistrate to determine the
necessity for the search is bypassed. 0 9 The decision regarding the
propriety of home entry would be made by the licensing agency, usu-
ally the Department of Social Services, which is clearly not a neu-
tral, detached party. The "dragnet searches" and "general explora-
tory rummaging" so abhorred by the framers of the Constitution
could result because of unbridled governmental discretion.1 Al-
though allowing entry into the home without a warrant may offer
more protection for the children, fourth amendment protection for
Id. See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1533 (West Supp. 1985), supra note 27.
106. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1597.55 (West Supp. 1985), supra note 28.
107. Rush, 756 F.2d at 723.
108. Id. 714 n.1 and 715 n.3. This author has found no evidence that CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1533 has been repealed.
109. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
110. Galloway, The Uninvited Ear: The Fourth Amendment Ban on Electronic Gen-
eral Searches, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 993, 994-1000 (1982) (author concludes that ex-
tended electronic surveillance is a general search and seizure); Comment, The Erosion of Prob-
able Cause, 13 N. CAROLINA CENT. L.J. 212 (1982) (arguing that expansion of the Terry
standard to areas where there is little if any danger to law enforcement officials threatens to
eliminate probable cause and fourth amendment protection against unreasonable search and
seizure).
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the home would be seriously eroded.11
D. A Warrant Based on Reasonable Articulable Suspicion
Analysis of the various search standards and warrant require-
ments defined by the courts in other situations reveals that not one of
them provides protection for both the children and the family day-
care provider. Accordingly, this comment recommends that absent
exigent circumstances, the courts require that a warrant based on
reasonable articulable suspicion be issued by a neutral magistrate
before entry into the family day-care home is permitted and a search
begins.1 2 Clearly, a search of the family day-care home must be al-
lowed if the children are to be adequately protected. However, the
requirement of a warrant based on reasonable articulable suspicion
will protect the day-care provider as well.
Although the courts have not used this standard as a basis for
issuing a warrant, to do so in the context of licensed family day-care
homes would fairly and effectively protect the strong interests of the
children as well as the day-care providers. Reasonable articulable
suspicion would require an objective, reasonable belief that is more
than mere suspicion but less than probable cause. Unbridled govern-
mental discretion would be avoided because the determination to
enter a house would be made by the "neutral and detached" magis-
trate required by the Constitution."' The children would be ade-
quately protected because, in addition to the warrant based on rea-
sonable articulable suspicion, the state could enter the home
immediately if a true exigency exists. Moreover, the state could re-
quest an administrative search warrant if the purpose were to check
licensing or code requirements. With the addition of a warrant based
on reasonable articulable suspicion, the state would have a varied
and more adequate arsenal to protect the well-being of the children.
If a reasonable articulable suspicion standard is adopted, and
the government is allowed to intrude into the privacy of a home on
less than probable cause, it is critical that carefully defined limits be
111. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). One might query as to whether knowl-
edge of warrantless searches might discourage potential licensed day-care providers from ever
offering their homes for child care.
112. In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Supreme Court upheld the search of the student's
purse by school officials acting without warrant or probable cause. The Court applied the
Camara balancing test and determined that the search was reasonable. Thus the Court has
already extended the permissible search under the reasonable articuable suspicion standard
from the brief pat-down in Terry to a full-scale search in T.L.O. New Jersy v. T.L.O., 105 S.
Ct. 733 (1985).
113. Shadwick, 407 U.S. at 345.
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established in order to guarantee that the search is minimally intru-
sive. Recalling that the pat-down search in Terry was limited to feel-
ing outer clothing for the presence of a weapon,1"" the house search
must be carefully limited to the purpose of discovering danger or
harm to children. The search should include immediate access to the
children but no automatic right to search drawers or to read personal
papers. The warrant based on reasonable articulable suspicion must
specifically state which areas of the house may be searched.1"" And
finally, the "plain view doctrine"1 6 which allows for the admissibil-
ity of any evidence inadvertently discovered during a lawful search
should not apply. An inadvertent discovery of evidence concerning a
crime unrelated to the purpose for which the warrant is issued (i.e.,
health and safety of children) should not be admissible against the
day-care provider. Because the government could enter the home on
a lower standard than probable cause, it is only fair that the provider
be held to answer only for illegal activities that relate to the health
and safety of children. The suggested limits on the intrusiveness of
the search would help to achieve the proper balance between the
competing interest of the home owner's right to privacy and the pro-
tection of children. These limitations on the state are a small price to
pay in return for entry into a family home on less than probable
cause.
Because of the serious implications of entering a home on less
than probable cause, it is critical that the recommendations in this
comment be very narrowly constured. The reasonable articuable sus-
picion standard is appropriate in the context of day care, because
daycare providers arguably have given up some privacy rights by
opening up their homes to children. It would be untenable, however,
if this standard were extended out of the day-care context and the
government attempted, for example, to enter a child's own home
with only a reasonable articuable suspicion of child abuse. Justice
Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in part in T.L.O. states:
Moved by whatever momentary evil has aroused their fears, of-
ficials-perhaps even supported by a majority of citizens-may
be tempted to conduct searches that sacrifice the liberty of each
citizen to assuage the perceived evil. But the Fourth Amend-
ment rests on the principle that a true balance between the indi-
vidual and society depends on the recognition of the right to be
114. Terry, 392 U.S. I at 29-30.
115. See supra note 7 for the text of the fourth amendment.
116. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1971).
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let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized man."'
V. CONCLUSION
The urgent need to protect children in day care is unquestioned.
The growing public outrage demands that immediate steps be taken.
However, absent exigent circumstances, the fourth amendment
stands guard at the threshold of the family day-care home. The state
cannot be allowed to enter any home without a warrant.
Allowing the state to enter a home to search without a warrant,
or with a warrant issued on less than reasonable articulable suspi-
cion, has serious consequences. If a house search is permitted based
only on suspicion or rumor, fourth amendment protections for day-
care providers will be irreparably undermined. In addition, because
privacy rights are rarely sacrificed lightly, people may be reluctant to
provide day-care in their homes altogether. If people are discouraged
from offering their homes for day-care because search warrants are
issued on less than reasonable articulable suspicion, the governmen-
tal policy of encouraging the growth of day-care would be
contravened.""
Alternatively, a search warrant which is based only upon a
showing of probable cause has equally serious ramifications. It hin-
ders the state in its efforts to protect children and ultimately fails to
address the critical problem of child abuse. Given the present public
outrage regarding child abuse, this standard is clearly unacceptable.
However, a warrant based on reasonable articulable suspicion
117. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 754 (1985).
118. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1596.72 (West Supp. 1985) which provides in
pertinent part:
The legislature finds all of the following:
(a) That day care facilities for children can contribute positively to a child's
emotional, cognitive, and educational development.
(b) That it is the intent of this state to provide a comprehensive, quality
system for licensing day care facilities for children to insure a quality day care
environment.
(c) That this system of licensure requires a special understanding of the
unique characteristics and needs of the children served by day care facilities.
(d) That it is the intent of the Legislature to establish within the State
Department of Social Services an organizational structure to separate licensing
of day care facilities for children from those facility types administered under
Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 1500).
(e) That good quality child day care services are an essential service for
working parents.
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provides a solution which best serves the compelling interests of all
concerned. The reasonable articulable suspicion standard will protect
the health and safety of children in family day-care homes without
sacrificing the privacy rights of family day-care providers.
Sandra Feldman

